One year and 7 months have passed since the start of the Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen and little has changed. There has been more death, destruction, and displacement, and all the while eyes have been focused on the besieged Syrian rebels of Aleppo and the operation to take back Mosul. With the internal power politics in Yemen understated, the war in Yemen has been painted simply as a proxy war in the regional chess game between arch enemies Saudi Arabia and Iran, each one fighting for dominance in the region.
The current events transpired as a result of a failed political transition after the resignation of the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, under intense pressure during the Arab Spring. What was left was a struggling and weak Sunni-led central government faced with a growing insurgency by the most advanced and well-equipped branch of Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and an internal clash with the Houthis, who’ve led an insurgency since the 1990s. The result has been an external conflict on the geopolitical stage, with far-reaching regional repercussions where the balance of power in the Middle East is at risk.
With Saudi Arabia’s failure to manage the Yemeni government during the Arab Spring, this forced Saleh to cede power to his former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. This move, however, exacerbated tensions along tribal, ideological, political, and military lines, all the while Saudi Arabia played all the sides in Yemen, not knowing what the outcome would be. By the time Hadi was in power, the ground was ripe for the Houthis to take advantage and gain enough tribal support to push out of its northern stronghold of Saada. Having to deal with the chaos left in the wake of the Arab Spring, be it in quelling pro-democracy protests in Bahrain, subduing any resistance at home, or aiding rebel groups in the budding Syrian civil war, the Saudi government was not paying attention to developments in Yemen. Without any warning, Iran started to back the Houthis and it began to gain ground in Yemen. Saleh then returned and by weakening the already feeble government, the internal power dynamic had changed.
What once began as a problem of domestic issues soon took on religious undertones. Soon, the Houthis were all falsely painted as Zaidis, a sub-sect of Shiism that, historically, has had the least conflict with the more dominant Sunni sect. The Zaidis even ruled parts of Yemen for close to a millennium, until the 1960s and were even supported by the Saudi government in the 1970s. It is thus evident that this attempt to create conflict within the region was based on contemporary fabrications rather than historical religious tensions. Despite this, with the Houthis backs to the walls, and Iran happily offering its support, religious divisions deepened. This new cooperation was evident by the signing of an aviation agreement soon after the capture of Sanaa, the Yemeni capital.
With the weakening of their proxies and lacking the military capabilities to intervene directly, the Saudi government had to change course. Now, with the backing of 10 other fellow Arab and African states, a newly formed Saudi-led alliance launched an aerial war with the vague goal of weakening the Houthis and forcing them back to Saada all the while trying to stave off the growing Iranian influence in its own backyard. However, with Iran providing weapons, equipment, and money, the Houthis continue to make massive gains. The Houthis are in a position similar to one of Iran’s other proxies, Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The Houthis are the biggest force in Yemen, however, much like Hezbollah’s situation, the political and demographic conditions do not allow them to assume governance of their country. However, lacking a sympathetic neighbour, Iran does not have a conduit to nurture the Houthis.
Without a clear plan to deal with the situation in Yemen, increasing numbers of civilians are killed.
Photo: IRIN Photos/Flickr/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
According to data collected by the Yemeni agriculture ministry, the alliance has been striking agricultural infrastructure in some regions, and according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, only 2.8% of Yemen’s land is actually cultivated. With such a small area, it can be concluded that this the farmland is being specifically targeted. In the case that the Houthis are successful, they would be left without food and would be reliant on imported goods – most likely from the Gulf Arab states or at least pass through them. And without their approval, they would be left to suffer unless the Houthis cede.
One surprising development, however, is the increasingly friendly relationship between the Canadian government and the Saudi government. At a time when most governments are criticizing the alliance for its strikes on civilian targets and delaying or canceling weapons shipments, the Canadian government has continued to dutifully fulfill its $15 billion arms shipment, it’s largest in its history, to the Saudi kingdom. With that, Canada has become the second largest weapons dealer in the Middle East. With Canada supplying light armoured vehicles (LAV) to the Saudi government, it risks the possibility of becoming indirectly involved in the kingdom’s war. This would not be an unlikely progression, as these LAVs have been used to quell protests in Bahrain.
With Saudi Arabia and its allies indecisive about the situation in Yemen, an opening is created for Iranian influence, which Saudi Arabia also wishes to squash. By focusing on the Houthis, AQAP is being enabled and spreading its reach further then it has been. Without a strategic plan addressing Yemen’s domestic political, economic and social issues, a short-term bombing campaign does not lead one to be optimistic about the future.
By Hussein El-Khechen
Please note that opinions expressed are the author’s own. They do not necessarily reflect the views and values of The Blank Page.
